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The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly:  
The Unnecessarily Broad Impact of 
Qui Tam Civil False Claims Act Cases 
on Rural Health Care Providers 
Andrew M. Hyer† 
Abstract 
The civil False Claims Act (FCA) imposes harsh penalties against 
parties who misappropriate federal funds. The statute’s qui tam whistle-
blower provisions create strong financial incentives for private 
individuals to bring and pursue FCA cases against health providers on 
the government’s behalf—even where government attorneys decline to 
intervene. FCA cases where the government declined to intervene 
account for less than 2 percent of all recoveries in health care FCA cases. 
Yet the costs of defending such cases may be very high, especially for 
rural providers with small operating margins. Federal provider self-
referral and anti-kickback laws carve out various exceptions to support 
the financial viability of rural providers. The FCA, however, contains no 
such exceptions. Although Department of Justice (DOJ) policy directs 
officials to take into account community access to care in pursuing FCA 
cases against rural providers, the ability for private whistleblowers to 
pursue cases where the government declines to intervene undermines the 
DOJ’s ability to achieve that aim. This Article highlights the liability 
risks rural providers commonly face under the FCA and argues for 
amending the FCA to allow a whistleblower claim to proceed against 
providers serving designated underserved areas only where government 
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Introduction 
Over the years, the federal False Claims Act (FCA) has led to various 
highly publicized, billion-dollar settlements against large pharmaceutical 
companies and hospital systems.1 Despite this apparent focus on larger 
entities by federal health care fraud enforcement authorities, small rural 
providers are not immune from becoming entangled in expensive and 
protracted civil FCA litigation. This is especially true in light of the fact 
that federal FCA claims can be initiated and pursued solely by private 
whistleblowers independent of action by a government agency. 
Although lawmakers and agencies have created various legislative 
and regulatory exceptions aimed at easing administrative burdens and 
costs for rural providers working in underserved communities, lawmakers 
have not created similar exceptions for FCA whistleblower claims. Most 
problematic is the fact that a whistleblower may unilaterally pursue such 
a claim on the government’s behalf even if governmental authorities do 
not see cause to pursue one—or are opposed to doing so. Such a situation 
arguably runs counter to various policy efforts to maintain the financial 
viability of critical access providers in underserved areas. This Article 
highlights the potential risks that rural providers face under the FCA 
and discusses whether, as a matter of public policy, Congress should 
reassess broad application of the FCA’s whistleblower provisions to rural 
providers in underserved areas. Although this Article’s primary focus is 
to show the need for a change in the FCA’s whistleblower provisions to 
protect the financial viability of health practice in underserved rural 
areas, it will also assist rural providers seeking to understand potential 
liability under the FCA. 
 
1. See, e.g., Dinesh Kumar, Note, Adverse Events: Ethical Issues in the 
Prosecution of Qui Tam Health Care Fraud Cases under the False Claims 
Act, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 661, 666 tbl. 1 (2012) (discussing major 
FCA recoveries in recent years); Evan Perez, Lawsuits Bring in $3 Billion 
for U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2010, at A4; Duff Wilson, Novartis Settles 
Off-Label Marketing Case Over 6 Drugs for $422.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2010, at B5.  
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Part I provides a brief overview of the FCA and its whistleblower 
provisions as applied to the health care industry. It highlights how FCA 
claims may be brought and pursued solely by a private whistleblower 
even where government authorities choose not to intervene and explains 
why this practice is problematic for rural providers. Part II discusses 
rural health care and the various federal laws and programs designed to 
make practicing in underserved rural areas more financially viable. Part 
III argues that policymakers should consider amending the FCA to allow 
whistleblower claims to proceed against certain rural providers only if 
government authorities choose intervene in the case.  
I. The False Claims Act, Whistleblower Provisions, 
and Rural Health Care Providers 
The FCA and its whistleblower provisions were enacted in the wake 
of the Civil War to address concerns of rampant fraud perpetrated by 
government contractors during Reconstruction.2 The policy behind the 
FCA is to create strict penalties for those who misappropriate govern-
ment funds.3 To encourage those with “insider information” of fraudulent 
activities to come forward, the FCA contains whistleblower provisions 
allowing a private citizen to bring an FCA claim on the government’s 
behalf and receive a portion of the money recovered through that 
action.4 
After significant amendments to the FCA in 1986, federal authorities 
and private whistleblowers began applying the statute to the health care 
 
2. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696–98 (1863); see also 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 781 
(2000) (“[T]he FCA was enacted in 1863 with the principal goal of 
‘stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large [private] contractors 
during the Civil War.’”) (quoting United States v. Borstein, 423 U.S. 303, 
309 (1976)); see also United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958); 
Robert Salcido, The Government’s Increasing Use of the False Claims Act 
Against the Health Care Industry, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 457, 460 (2003).  
3. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A 
Civil War Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 461 
(1998) (noting that the FCA’s primary purposes are: “(1) protecting the 
public fisc and the integrity of federal programs by deterring the 
submission of false or fraudulent claims, (2) securing restitution of 
government losses by fraud, and (3) punishing those who defraud the 
government”); see also Thomas F. O’Neill III, et al., The Buck Stops Here: 
Preemption of Third-Party Claims by the False Claims Act, 12 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 41, 43 (1995). 
4. 37 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2011). Depending on the value of the whistleblower’s 
contribution to the case and whether the government joins in the case, a 
whistleblower is entitled to 10–30 percent of the government’s recovery.  
§ 3730(d)(1)–(2). A prevailing whistleblower is entitled to an additional 
award of his or her attorney’s fees. § 3730(d)(4).  
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industry.5 One commentator notes that after these 1986 amendments, 
“the FCA now lies at the heart of the federal government’s war on 
healthcare fraud.”6 Between 1987 and 2011, settlements and judgments 
in health care-related FCA actions totaled approximately $21 billion.7 
The FCA’s scope and its whistleblower provisions were further broad-
ened as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 
20098 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.9 
A. Current Application of the FCA to the Health Care Industry 
As amended, an individual or organization violates the FCA by 
“knowingly present[ing], or caus[ing] to be presented, a false or fraudu-
lent claim for payment” with federal funds.10 A violator can be held 
liable for up to three times the actual monetary damages incurred by the 
government and $5000 to $10,000 per false claim.11 Additionally, the 
defendant is required to pay a prevailing whistleblower’s attorney’s 
 
5. See David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New 
Firepower Is Aimed at Health Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127, 129–
30 (1995) (discussing the 1986 amendments and subsequent increase in use 
of the FCA in the health arena). 
6. Joan H. Krause, Twenty-Five Years of Health Law Through the Lens of the 
Civil False Claims Act, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 13, 13 (2010). 
7. CIVIL DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS – OVERVIEW 
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_ 
FCA_Statistics.pdf. 
8. 111 Pub. L. No. 21, 123, § 4(a), Stat. 1617 (2009). Among other 
amendments made by FERA, the definition of the term “claim” was 
broadened to apply to situations where a subcontractor presents false 
claims to a private primary contractor with no intent or even knowledge 
that the claim would result in the government over-paying the primary 
contractor. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2011) (defining the term “claim” 
to include a request for money “made to a contractor, grantee, or other 
recipient” where the original source of the money is the federal 
government). This amendment effectively overruled the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of FERA’s prior definition of “claim” in Allison 
Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, wherein the Court held that 
FERA requires “the defendant to intend that a claim be ‘paid . . . by the 
Government’ and not by another entity.” 553 U.S. 662, 670 (2008).  
9. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901 (2010). 
10. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2011). 
11. Id. § 3729(a)(1). FERA has a provision limiting liability to “not less than 2 
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains” if the 
defendant fully cooperates in the investigation. Id. § 3729(a)(2)(B). As 
explained below, however, because FCA cases against health care providers 
almost never go to trial damages are very rarely assessed by a court. 
Accordingly, this “reduced damages” amendment may have only a 
negligible impact on the outcome of future FCA cases. 
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fees.12 Defendants in civil FCA cases may be named as defendants in 
parallel administrative and criminal proceedings, and any health care 
provider found liable under the FCA faces potential exclusion from all 
federal health programs (namely Medicare and Medicaid).13 
The FCA casts a broad net as to the types of conduct potentially in 
violation of the statute. It expansively defines the term “knowingly” to 
include not only “actual knowledge” of the false statements but also acts 
made in “deliberate ignorance” or in “reckless disregard” of the infor-
mation’s truth or falsity.14 The statute’s definition of “knowingly” 
clarifies that the FCA is violated even where there is “no proof of 
specific intent to defraud” the government.15 As one court explained, 
Congress defined knowledge broadly “to reach what has become known 
as the ostrich type situation where an individual has buried his head in 
the sand and failed to make simple inquiries which would alert him that 
false claims are being submitted.”16 
Under this broad definition of knowledge, Medicaid and Medicare  
providers can be held liable under the FCA for not only willful fraudulent 
billing but also for sloppy billing or a failure to supervise and train billing 
staff if such conduct rises to the level of “reckless disregard.” Additionally, 
under FERA, a failure to timely return to the government any overpay-
ments may also give rise to FCA liability.17  
 
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2011). Under this statute, a whistleblower may 
recover attorney’s fees and costs if the defendant is found liable or makes a 
payment to settle the case. See id. (stating that a whistleblower is entitled 
to a portion “of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim” and 
that “[a]ny such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable 
expenses which the courts finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs”). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6) (2011) (setting forth discretionary authority to 
exclude providers found liable under FCA from participation in federal 
health programs). As one commentator explains, “exclusion is tantamount 
to an economic death penalty, because few providers can survive without 
the ability to receive revenues associated with the care of Medicare and 
Medicaid patients.” Robert B. Ramsey, III, Corporate Integrity 
Agreements: Making the Best of a Tough Situation, HEALTHCARE 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Mar. 2002, at 58. 
14. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A). 
15. Id. §3729(b)(1)(B). 
16. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992).  
17. Industry commentaries reflect concern that this additional provision may 
increase the potential for FCA liability. Robert C. Blume & Andrew S. 
Tulumello, President Obama Signs Legislation Significantly Expanding the 
Scope of the False Claims Act, GIBSON DUNN (May 26, 2009), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/PresidentObamaLegislation 
ExpandsScope-FalseClaimsAct.aspx (noting that this amendment “opens up 
new avenues of exposure against federal contractors or grantees for 
knowingly retaining government ‘overpayments’”). See also Mark Taylor, 
Feds Refocus on Fraud: Hospitals Must Ramp Up Compliance Programs to 
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From the perspective of a provider seeking to avoid potential FCA 
issues, these consequences point to the need to have and implement an 
effective compliance program and to have properly qualified health 
information management and compliance professionals overseeing the 
billing process.18 Such preventative measures minimize the occurrence of 
erroneous overpayments, better assure that overpayments are promptly 
returned, and help prove that the provider was not acting with “reckless 
disregard” in the event of an FCA claim. Because of the importance of 
employing well-trained compliance and billing individuals to avoid FCA 
liability, the shortage of technically qualified professionals in many rural 
areas may pose a problem for providers in those areas.19 
If an FCA claim is brought against a provider, the statute’s broad 
definition of “knowingly” makes defending and resolving the case 
complicated and expensive for the defendant provider. In a traditional 
common law fraud claim, a defendant could have the case dismissed in 
the pretrial phase unless the plaintiff offers evidence that the defendant 
had a knowing and willful intent to defraud.20 Under the FCA, however, 
there is room for a fact-intensive inquiry into the gray area between 
what constitutes negligent billing mistakes and errors arising out of 
 
Meet New Provisions, TRUSTEE, Feb. 2011, at 20 (quoting health attorney 
Robert Homchick that this amendment “increases the stakes in how 
hospitals will deal with what they uncover during their compliance reviews, 
audits or something that surfaces in the ordinary course of business”). 
18. Taylor, supra note 17, at 17. 
19. See Charles W. Fluharty, Refrain or Reality: A United States Rural 
Policy?: Implications for Rural Health Care, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 57, 64 
(2002) (“[F]ewer young adults in rural areas seek post-secondary education, 
have college degrees, or have no high school diplomas . . . .”); COMM. ON 
THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH CARE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
QUALITY THROUGH COLLABORATION: THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH 79 
(2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11140 
(“For decades, rural and frontier communities have struggled to attract and 
retain an adequate supply of the various health care professionals . . . .”). 
Demand for health information management professionals involved with 
billing and compliance in rural areas is expected to increase in coming 
years. See Candi Helseth, HIT Workforce a Growing Concern for Critical 
Access Hospitals, RURAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, http://www.raconline.org/ 
newsletter/spring12/feature.php#story2 (last updated Apr. 24, 2012) 
(“Primary care workforce shortages are a given in rural health care. Now 
rural providers—particularly in Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs)—are 
facing another daunting workforce shortage: technology professionals in 
high demand and short supply.”). 
20. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit to Fraudulent Conveyances and 
Transfers § 23 (2001) (“The five traditional elements of fraud, each of 
which must be established by evidence that is not equally consistent with 
either honesty or deceit include: a false representation; in reference to a 
material fact; made with knowledge of its falsity; with the intent to 
deceive; and on which an action is taken in justifiable reliance upon the 
representation.”). 
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“willful ignorance” or “reckless disregard.” As such, it is more difficult 
for a defendant in an FCA case—even one who would probably not be 
found liable at trial—to convince a court to dismiss the case in the 
pretrial phase. Moreover, considering the high penalties and damages 
associated with liability under the FCA, the potential for exclusion from 
Medicare and Medicaid, and the high litigation costs involved in pursu-
ing a complex claim, often the only realistic option for an FCA 
defendant is to settle.21 Thus, even if a defendant has a strong defense 
and plausible odds of prevailing at trial, the potential consequences of 
losing may be too great to risk. Some commentators suggest that the 
fact that such defenses are never presented at trial emboldens whistle-
blowers’ attorneys and government authorities to seek unreasonably high 
settlements in cases with relatively weak evidence and untested legal 
theories.22 As explained below, such a situation may be particularly 
problematic where authorities opt not to intervene in a case, and a 
whistleblower unilaterally pursues an FCA settlement against a critical 
access provider in an underserved rural area. 
B. FCA Cases Pursued Unilaterally by Whistleblowers  
FCA cases may be initiated by the government or a private whistle-
blower with insider information. Actions brought by whistleblowers are 
commonly referred to as qui tam cases.23 The vast majority of FCA 
matters in the health care arena somehow involve a qui tam whistle-
blower.24 For example, during the first three quarters of 2011, the 
Department of Justice reported 417 new FCA matters involving federal 
 
21. Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 276 (2004) (“Given the balance of power, it 
should come as no surprise that prosecutors have the power to ‘encourage’ 
settlements, even where abstract legal analysis might favor the 
defendant.”). 
22. See Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal 
Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity Agreements and the 
Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 625, 651 (2007) 
(“[I]t is nearly inevitable that a health care provider accused of wrongdoing 
will settle a civil or criminal suit, because the risks involved in proceeding 
to trial are far too high and may jeopardize the provider’s very 
existence.”); Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: 
Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36. GA. 
L. REV. 121, 127 (2001) (“Within the industry, there is a growing concern 
that the Act’s enormous penalties may force health care providers to settle 
cases that could not be proven in court, such as allegations of falsity 
stemming from good faith interpretations of ambiguous regulations.”). 
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2011). The language of the FCA refers to the 
whistleblower as the qui tam plaintiff. Courts frequently refer to the 
whistleblower as the “relator.”  
24. See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 7. 
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health programs where a whistleblower was involved and only thirty-
seven where a whistleblower was not involved.25  
Because schemes to defraud the government may be difficult to detect 
by authorities, the FCA’s whistleblower provisions have been crafted to 
create strong financial incentives for a private individual with insider 
information to come forward.26 Successful whistleblowers are entitled to 
10 to 30 percent of the government’s total recovery and a separate 
award of attorney’s fees.27 To sustain a qui tam claim under the FCA, 
the whistleblower must be the “original source” of information that has 
not previously been “publicly disclosed.”28 The Department of Health & 
Human Services Office of the Inspector General (HHS OIG) explains 
that “[w]histleblowers could be current or ex-business partners, hospital 
or office staff, patients, or competitors.”29  
A whistleblower alleging a violation of the FCA brings a claim by 
filing a complaint under seal.30 The complaint remains under seal for 
sixty days or longer while the government investigates the case and 
determines whether it will intervene.31 If the government intervenes, the 
whistleblower’s attorneys and the government’s attorneys will pursue the 
case together.32 If the government chooses not to intervene, the whistle-
blower’s attorneys may pursue the case on their own.33 Although the 
DOJ does not publish data on the proportion of qui tam cases in which 
 
25. Id. Between 1987 and 2011, there were a total of 4365 qui tam cases, 
compared to only 727 non-qui tam. Id. 
26. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006); see also Brian G. Santo, The False Claims 
Act: Analysis of the Recently Expanded Legislation on Qui Tam Actions 
and Related Impact on Whistleblowers, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE, 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource 
_home/Volume6_SE2_Santo.html (last updated July 22, 2010) 
(explaining that the FCA “was established to elicit help from private 
citizens to fight fraud, permitting people to sue in the name of the United 
States and collect a portion of the recovery the government obtains”). 
27. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
28. Id. § 3730(e). The PPACA amended the statute’s definition of “original 
source” to broaden and clarify the type of information a whistleblower may 
contribute in order to bring a suit under the FCA’s qui tam whistleblower 
provisions. See Santo, supra note 26.  
29. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, A ROADMAP FOR NEW PHYSICIANS: AVOIDING MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 3, http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-
education/roadmap_web_version.pdf (last visited June 3, 2013) [hereinafter 
OIG ROADMAP].  
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
31. Id. § 3730(b)(2)–(3).  
32. Kumar, supra note 1, at 663–64. 
33. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c). 
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it intervenes,34 it does report the annual amounts recovered through qui 
tam cases based on whether the government intervened. Between 1987 
and 2011, the total recovery in cases where the government chose not to 
intervene was a small fraction—only 2.3 percent—of the government’s 
total recoveries in health care qui tam cases.35 If one includes the amount 
the government has recovered in health care FCA cases not involving a 
whistleblower, cases in which the government has not intervened account 
for only 1.7 percent of the FCA recoveries in the health arena since 
1987.36 Accordingly, it is apparent that qui tam cases in which the 
government has not intervened play, in relative terms, a very small role 
in recovering fraudulently obtained governmental funds.  
Although, in terms of amounts recovered, qui tam cases where the 
government has not intervened are fairly insignificant, such cases may 
still be quite expensive for a health care provider to defend. Moreover, 
professional malpractice liability insurance policies likely will not cover 
FCA liability under most circumstances,37 so providers must pay defense 
costs out-of-pocket or have another type of insurance coverage. And 
although some types of Directors and Officers Liability insurance policies 
may cover civil FCA liability and legal defense costs,38 other policies 
contain standard exclusions that may “have profound and often unantic-
ipated consequences in the context of FCA claims.”39 To the extent 
insurance coverage may be available for FCA-related issues in a Directors 
and Officers policy, obtaining such coverage may require strict adherence 
to insurer notice requirements and involve a legal dispute with the 
insurance carrier.40 Finally, although some insurance carriers offer 
 
34. See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 7. 
35. Id. From 1987 to 2011, the government recovered a total of approximately 
$15.8 billion in qui tam health care cases; of this amount, approximately 
$15.5 billion was recovered in cases where the government intervened. Id. 
36. Id. The DOJ reports recovering approximately $5.15 billion in civil health 
fraud cases not involving a qui tam relator between 1987 and 2011. Id. 
37. See, e.g., Zurich American Ins. Co. v. O’Hara Regional Centers for 
Rehabilitation, 529 F.3d 916, 918–20 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
“acts or omissions” provision in a professional liability insurance policy 
does not cover FCA liability, even where FCA liability is premised upon 
the argument that the provider wrongfully billed for substandard care). 
For helpful discussions on the potential for FCA liability based on 
providing (and then billing the government for) substandard care, see 
United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152–53 
(W.D. Mo. 2000). 
38. Stephen T. Raptis, Surviving False Claims Act Allegations: What Every 
Government Contractor Needs to Know to Maximize Insurance Coverage, 
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, Apr. 2012, at 59. 
39. Id. 
40. See id. at 63 (noting that insurance “policy language is subject to legal 
interpretation”). 
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policies directly related to FCA and other false claim-related issues,41 
purchasing such coverage may be unduly costly for rural providers.  
In short, while the potential financial exposure associated with  
defending FCA cases is significant for any health care provider partici-
pating in federal programs,42 such exposure may be particularly 
problematic for less sophisticated rural providers with tight operating 
budgets. DOJ internal policy accordingly directs its attorneys to consider 
the potential effects of a lawsuit on the community’s access to care: 
When dealing with rural and community hospitals and other health 
care providers, Department attorneys shall consider the impact an 
action may have on the community being served. In determining an 
appropriate resolution, or deciding whether to bring an action, care 
must be taken to consider the community’s interest in access to  
adequate health care along with any other relevant concerns.43 
In dealing with a provider who is vital to the community, and where the 
alleged conduct is not egregious,44 DOJ attorneys may properly decide to 
forgo a claim. A whistleblower pursuing a case unilaterally, however, is 
not required to take such factors into account. To the contrary, the 
whistleblower has strong financial incentives to obtain a substantial 
recovery regardless of the impact it may have on a rural provider’s 
financial viability and the community’s access to care. 
If a health care provider was to prevail in an FCA case brought  
unilaterally by a whistleblower, the FCA provides a narrow remedy for 
the provider to recover attorney’s fees upon a showing that the lawsuit 
was “clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for 
 
41. See, e.g., Physician Regulatory Insurance/RAC Audit Insurance, 
GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE, http://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/products/ 
fraud-abuse/ (last visited May 3, 2013) (advertising insurance products 
specifically addressed to FCA liability). 
42. See Pamela H. Bucy, The Path from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching 
Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3, 40–42 (2000) (discussing the financial 
burden health care fraud investigations potentially create for teaching 
hospitals). 
43. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys et al. (June 3, 1998), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/chcm.htm. 
44. For example, a health care provider may face potential FCA liability for 
the wrongful conduct of another entity or individual with whom it 
contracts—even if the provider itself has done nothing wrong. See The 
Heart Doctors v. Layne, No. 6:05-636, 2006 WL 2692694, at *3 (E.D. Ky. 
Sept. 13, 2006); Keely E. Duke & Andrew M. Hyer, Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place: Limitations on a Health Care Provider’s Right to 
Indemnification when It Is Targeted Under the False Claims Act as a 
Result of the Fraudulent Activities of a Third Party with Which It 
Contracts or Associates, FEDERAL LAWYER, Feb. 2009, at 28. 
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purposes of harassment.”45 Under this stringent standard, an award of 
attorney’s fees is only awarded to a prevailing defendant. As mentioned 
above, the high defense costs and potentials for high damages and 
exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid leave most 
defendants with no option but to settle if the defendant cannot obtain a 
dismissal in the pretrial stage. And even if a defendant were to prevail, 
it must also show that the lawsuit was frivolous, vexatious, or brought 
for harassment.46 This sets a high bar,47 and courts will refuse to award 
attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in the absence of “clear” evi-
dence of this type of conduct.48 
II. Rural Health and Rural Providers 
Although all health care providers that accept any form of govern-
mental funding should be aware of the potential risk of FCA liability, 
the cost and expense of defending a whistleblower FCA claim may be 
particularly onerous for some rural providers. As illustrated below, a 
general goal of many government programs and policies is to promote 
the financial viability of providers in underserved rural areas. Accordingly, 
this Section first provides an overview of the status of heath care in rural 
America and the characteristics of rural providers. It then explains 
provider shortage designations used by federal agencies and the major 
policies and laws intended to increase the attractiveness and viability of 
practicing in underserved rural areas. 
A. Rural Health in the United States 
For reasons related to both patient demographic characteristics and 
lack of access to care, rural populations in the United States often suffer 
 
45. 31 U.S.C.§ 3730(d)(4) (2006). 
46. Id. 
47. See United States ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Cont’l Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869, 
875 (5th Cir. 2008) (“An action is not frivolous if existing law or a 
reasonable suggestion for its extension, modification, or reversal supports 
the action.”). 
48. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ubl v. IIF Data Solutions, 650 F.3d 445, 
458 (4th Cir. 2011) (reversing trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to 
prevailing FCA defendant under abuse of discretion standard, reasoning 
that the relator’s FCA claims “objectively” had some “reasonable chance of 
success”); Rafizadeh, 553 F.3d at 875 (upholding district court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees on the basis that the relator’s suit 
was not “clearly vexatious”). But see Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337 
(4th Cir. 2009) (upholding award of attorney’s fees to prevailing FCA 
defendant where relator’s action was jurisdictionally barred because the 
information had been publically disclosed and he was not the original 
source of the information). 
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worse health outcomes than populations in other parts of the country.49 
Compared to populations in more urban areas, those in rural areas are 
generally older, have lower education levels, lower income, and must 
travel greater distances to obtain health care.50 Rural residents are also 
more likely to be in fair or poor health and have chronic conditions.51 In 
light of these factors, in creating the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) in 1999, Congress identified “the delivery of health 
care in . . . rural areas (including frontier areas)” as an area of concern.52 
Each year, AHRQ produces an annual report tracking health disparities 
among individuals from various underserved or vulnerable “priority 
populations,” which includes individuals residing in rural areas.53 Rural 
areas face significant challenges because of financial difficulties and a 
shortage of qualified professionals. Only 11.4 percent of physicians in the 
United States practice in rural areas despite 19.2 percent of the popula-
tion living in those areas.54 Nationwide health data from 2004–2008 
reveals that residents of nonmetropolitan areas had higher inpatient 
heart attack mortality rates than residents of large fringe metropolitan 
areas.55 In 2005, nonmetropolitan areas of the country had an age-
adjusted mortality rate of approximately eighty deaths higher per 
100,000 people than in metropolitan areas.56 Similarly, in 2000, approxi-
mately 20.5 percent of the population aged 16–64 in nonmetropolitan 
areas reported having a disability in contrast to the metropolitan 
percentage of 18.2 percent.57   
49. See LEIYU SHI & DOUGLAS A. SINGH, DELIVERING HEALTH CARE IN 
AMERICA: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 440 (5th ed. 2012) (“Access to health care 
[in rural areas] is affected by poverty, long distances, rural topography, 
weather conditions, and limited availability of personal transportation.”); 
CAROL ADAIRE JONES ET AL., HEALTH STATUS AND HEALTH CARE ACCESS 
OF FARM AND RURAL POPULATIONS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.  
7–9 (2009), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/155453/eib57_1_.pdf.  
50. JONES ET AL., supra note 49, at 5. 
51. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH DISPARITIES REPORT 239 (2011), 
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr11/nhdr11.pdf. 
52. Healthcare Research and Quality Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299 (2006). 
53. AHRQ, supra note 51, at 234. Other priority populations include racial and 
ethnic minorities, low-income groups, women, children, older adults, and 
“[i]ndividuals with special health needs, including individuals with 
disabilities and individuals who need chronic care or end-of-life care.” Id.  
54. ROGER A. ROSENBLATT ET AL., WWAMI RURAL HEALTH RES. CTR., THE 
FUTURE OF FAMILY MEDICINE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL PRIMARY CARE 
PHYSICIAN SUPPLY 6 (2010), available at http://depts.washington.edu/ 
uwrhrc/uploads/RHRC_FR125_Rosenblatt.pdf. 
55. AHRQ, supra note 51, at 61. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 9. 
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B. Designation as an Underserved Rural Area 
In recent years, there has been some debate as to how to define the 
term “rural.”58 The Economic Research Service in the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture has identified nine definitions of rural used for different 
purposes.59 The criteria used by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Office 
of Management and Budget laid the foundation for definitions of rural 
commonly used for health programs.60 Specifically, the U.S. Census 
Bureau identifies Urbanized Areas (of 50,000 or more people) and Urban 
Clusters (of 2,500 to 50,000) and then defines “rural” as “encompass[ing] 
all population, housing, and territory not included with [Urbanized 
Areas or Urban Clusters].”61 The Office of Management and Budget, on 
the other hand, groups more populous areas as either “metropolitan 
statistical areas” (areas with at least one urbanized area of at least 
50,000)62 or “micropolitan statistical areas (areas with at least one urban 
cluster of 10,000 to 50,000),63 with all less populous areas referred to as 
“outside core based statistical areas.”64  
For rural health care providers, the more significant issue is the  
debate over various methodologies used to designate which providers 
qualify for special federal assistance for providing care to underserved 
areas or populations. As explained below, such programs generally require 
designation as either a Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) or 
Medically Underserved Area or Population (MUA/P). What follows is a 
brief overview of the criteria used for each of these designations and a look 
at current proposals to change the criteria and methodologies for these 
designations. 
One of the most commonly used designations is for HPSAs. Formerly 
termed “Health Manpower Shortage Areas,” the designation was created 
 
58. See John Cromartie & Shawn Bucholtz, Defining the “Rural” in Rural 
America, AMBER WAVES, June 2008, at 28–29, 
http://webarchives.cdlib.org/sw1vh5dg3r/http://ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/ 
June08/PDF/RuralAmerica.pdf.  
59. See Rural Definitions: Data Documentation and Methods, USDA 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ 
rural-definitions/data-documentation-and-methods.aspx (last updated July 
5, 2012).  
60. See Defining the Rural Population, HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/ 
ruralhealth/policy/definition_of_rural.html (last visited May 14, 2013) 
(identifying these two agencies’ definitions as the “two major definitions of 
‘rural’ that the Federal government uses”).  
61. Urban Area Criteria for 2010 Census, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,030, 53,039 (Aug. 24, 
2011). 
62. 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical 
Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,246, 37,252 (June 28, 2010).  
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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under the Health Professionals Educational Assistance Act of 1976.65 
This designation has its roots in the National Health Services Corps 
program and was originally created to assess eligibility for programs 
intended to recruit health professionals to underserved areas.66 Although 
the use of the word “area” in the term “HPSA” tends to imply a 
geographically based definition, the HPSA designation may be given to 
geographic areas, specific population groups, or specific public or 
nonprofit provider facilities.67 There are also separate HPSA designations 
for various types of professionals: primary care, dental care, mental 
health care, vision care, podiatric care, and pharmacy.68 As such, there 
are different HPSA designation criteria depending on what is receiving 
the designation (a geographic area, population, or facility) or the types 
of professional for which there is a shortage.  
For example, a geographic area meets the definition of a primary 
medical care HPSA if: (1) there is a “rational area[] for the delivery of 
primary medical care services,”69 (2) the population in the area has a 
full-time equivalent primary care physician ratio of least 3500:1,70 and 
(3) primary care professionals in contiguous areas are “excessively 
distant, overutilized or inaccessible.”71 A primary care HPSA designation 
for a population group, however, generally requires that the members of 
the population group (1) live in an area that is “rational for delivery of 
 
65. Pub. L. No. 94-484, § 332(a)(1), 90 Stat. 2243, 2270 (1976). 
66. Negotiated Rulemaking Committee on the Designation of Medically 
Underserved Populations and Health Professional Shortage Areas, Final 
Report to the Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 21  
(Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.hrsa.gov/advisorycommittees/shortage/ 
nrmcfinalreport.pdf [hereinafter NRMC] (“[T]he HPSA designation process 
. . . is statutorily tied to the National Health Service Corps program, the 
Federal program that offers recruitment incentives, in the form of 
scholarship and loan repayment support, to health professionals committed 
to providing care in areas with health professional shortages.”).  
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 254e(a)(1) (2011) (defining “health professional shortage 
area” under the Public Health Services Act to include “an urban or rural 
area . . . , a population group which the Secretary determines has such a 
shortage, or a public or nonprofit private medical facility”); see also 42 
C.F.R. § 5.1 (2012) (“These regulations establish criteria and procedures 
for the designation of geographic areas, population groups, medical 
facilities, and other public facilities, in the States, as health professional(s) 
shortage areas.”).  
68. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 5 apps. A–E, G (2012).  
69. 42 C.F.R. § 5 app. A, pt. I.B.1 (2012). 
70. See id. at pt. I.D.1. The area also meets this physician ratio criterion if the 
area has a full-time equivalent primary care physician to population ratio 
of greater than 3000:1 and an “unusually high need [for primary care 
services] or insufficient capacity [of existing primary care providers].” Id. at 
pt. I.D.2. 
71. Id. at pt. I.A.6. 
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primary care medical care,” (2) have barriers to care access, possibly 
including “economic, linguistic, cultural or architectural” factors, and (3) 
have a primary-care-physician-to-population ratio of less than 3,000:1.72 
Finally, such primary care HPSA designation for facilities applies to 
certain correctional institutions73 and public or nonprofit medical 
facilities that serve a HPSA geographic area or population and have 
“insufficient capacity to meet the primary care needs of that area or 
population group.”74  
The HPSA designation criteria for other types of health professionals 
follow a similar model, although the specific requirements differ.75 As 
such, certain areas or populations may be a designated HPSA for one or 
multiple types of health professionals. In August 2012, HRSA reported 
that there were 54.4 million people living in 5,721 different primary care 
HPSAs. In contrast, there were 43.3 million people living in 4,405 dental 
HPSAs and 87.1 million people living in 3,689 mental health HPSAs. A 
total of nearly 30,000 additional primary care, dental, and mental health 
professionals would need to begin practicing in these areas to fully 
address this workforce shortage.76 
Other federal programs base eligibility on what are commonly re-
ferred to as medically underserved area or populations (MUA/Ps).77 This 
designation is generally used for clinics and health centers that qualify 
 
72. Id. at pt. II.A.1.  
73. See id. at pt. III.A. 
74. Id. at pt. III.B.1. 
75. For example, the geographic HPSA designation for dental care 
professionals requires a higher full-time-equivalent dentist ratio of 5000:1. 
See 42 C.F.R. § 5 app. B, pt. I.D.1 (2012). In contrast, for mental health 
professionals, the geographic HPSA designation applies different ratios 
depending on the specific type of mental health professional. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 5 app. C, pt. I.A.2 (2012). 
76. HRSA has identified the need for an additional 5848 primary care 
providers, 4585 dental providers, and 3802 mental health providers to meet 
the needs of each of these respective HPSAs. Shortage Designation: Health 
Professional Shortage Areas & Medically Underserved Areas/Populations, 
HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/shortage (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).  
77. The term MUA/P encompasses two separate designations contained in the 
same regulation. See 42 C.F.R. § 51c.102(e) (2011). MUAs are designated 
by the Secretary after consideration of factors including the available resources, 
health indices, and economic factors. Id. § 51c.102(e)(1)–(3). MUP, on the 
other hand, is used to refer to “the population of an urban or rural area 
designated by the Secretary as an area with a shortage of personal health 
services or a population group designated by the Secretary as having a 
shortage of such services.” Id. § 51c.102(e). See also NRMC, supra note 66, 
at 16 (using MUA in reference to “the entire population of a geographic 
area” and using MUP “only based on the members of the underserved 
population”). 
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for federal assistance.78 Whereas HPSAs focus on where there is a 
shortage of providers, the “MUA and MUP designations target Federal 
resources to those areas and populations where individuals have poor 
health status, low ability-to-pay, limited availability of primary care 
providers, and barriers to accessing primary care.”79 HHS considers the 
following four factors in designating MUA/Ps: 
(1) Available health resources in relation to size of the area and its 
population, including appropriate ratios of primary care physicians 
in general or family practice, internal medicine, pediatrics, or  
obstetrics and gynecology to population; (2) Health indices for the 
population of the area, such as infant mortality rate; (3) Economic 
factors affecting the population’s access to health services, such as 
percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty level; 
and (4) Demographic factors affecting the population’s need and 
demand for health services, such as percentage of the population 
age 65 and over.80 
For MUAs, the agency considers these factors in relation to the popula-
tion as a whole in a given area.81 For MUPs, the agency considers these 
factors only in relation to the underserved population of interest.82 In 
practice, HHS applies these regulatory provisions using the Index of 
Medical Underservice (IMU), with any area or population scoring 62.0 or 
less (where zero represents “completely underserved” and 100 represents 
“best served”) qualifying as an MUA/P.83 
Although the HPSA designation was developed with a focus on  
provider recruitment and the MUA/P was developed with a focus on 
underserved populations, there is significant overlap between these 
designations.84 Over the last several decades, there have been several 
failed efforts by policymakers to create a comprehensive methodology.85 
 
78. NRMC, supra note 66, at 21. 
79. Id. 
80. 42 C.F.R. § 51c.102(e)(1)–(4). 
81. NRMC, supra note 66, at 16. 
82. Id. 
83. Medically Underserved Areas & Populations (MUA/Ps), HRSA, 
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/muaps/index.html (last visited July 4, 
2013). 
84. NRMC, supra note 66, at 21. 
85. In 1998 and 2008, HRSA issued proposed final rules combining the HPSA 
and MUA/P designations. “In both cases, many public comments were 
received, and the concerns expressed resulted in a HRSA decision to 
reconsider and develop a new proposal to be published at a later date; no 
final revised rule as yet been adopted.” Designation of Medically 
Underserved Populations and Health Professions Shortage Areas; Intent to 
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Under a provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
however, HRSA is directed to undertake negotiated rulemaking86 to 
establish “a comprehensive methodology and criteria” for the HPSA and 
MUA/P designations.87 In November 2011, HRSA’s Negotiated Rulemak-
ing Committee on the topic issued its final report recommending a 
number of changes. While the Committee did not recommend that the 
methodologies used for assigning the HPSA and MUA/P designations be 
combined,88 it proposed a number of other changes in designation 
methodologies. Most significantly, for both the MUA/P and Primary 
Care HPSA designations, the Committee proposed including nurse 
practitioners, physician assistants, and certified nurse midwives in the 
determination of primary care provider-to-population ratios.89 The 
Committee also proposed lowering the provider-to-population thresholds 
required to qualify as an underserved area90 and increasing emphasis on 
patients’ ability to pay in designating MUAs.91  
The recommendations in the Committee’s report were approved by a 
vote of twenty-one to two (with five members absent).92 As of this 
writing, however, HHS has not yet issued an interim or proposed final 
rule based on the Committee’s report, and it is unclear whether the 
 
Form Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,167, 26,167 
(May 11, 2010).  
86. Negotiated rulemaking is governed by the procedures of the Federal 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570. Under these procedures, 
the agency creates a “negotiated rulemaking committee” to draft a 
proposed rule, 5 U.S.C. §§ 562(6)–(7), rather than following the more 
common notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures under the federal 
Administrative Procedures Act. See also William Funk, Bargaining 
Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of 
the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356–58 (1997) (providing a general 
overview of the development of negotiated rulemaking). 
87. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 5602(a)(1), 124 Stat. 678 (2010). 
88. NRMC, supra note 66, at 21 (“The Committee recommends maintaining 
the current distinction between these two major types of 
shortage/underservice designations: health professional shortage and health 
service shortage. Although the legislative requirements for the two 
designation types are similar in many respects, they are rooted in distinct 
legislative histories and each has unique practical applications.”). 
89. Id. at 26. 
90. Id. at 32. 
91. Id. at 34–35. 
92. At the outset of the negotiated rulemaking, the Committee defined the 
term “consensus” to mean unanimous support. Id. at 7. Accordingly, the 
Committee technically failed to reach a consensus in this regard. Id. 
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agency will proceed with finalizing the recommended changes.93 The 
Committee estimates that approximately 12 million people live in areas 
that stand to lose the geographic HPSA designation under the proposed 
criteria, with another 20 million living in areas that would gain the 
designation. Additionally, 16 million people live in areas that would lose 
the MUA designation under the Committee’s proposed criteria, and 48 
million live in areas that would be designated as MUAs. Accordingly, if 
the HPSA and MUA/P designation methodology is changed according to 
the Committee’s recommendations, there could be a substantial shift in 
the types of providers that benefit from programs under the new 
designations. Specifically, the increased emphasis on ability-to-pay in 
designating MUAs may lead to the loss of this designation in areas 
where the current designation is based more on a shortage of providers 
rather than on a high poverty rate. Similarly, the inclusion of nurse 
practitioners, physician assistants, and certified nurse midwives in the 
provider-to-population ratio may impact the staffing decisions made by 
providers located in geographic HPSAs. As explained below, the MUA/P 
and HPSA designations have substantial impacts on a provider’s 
eligibility for a variety of federal assistance programs. A rural health 
care provider should take measures to ensure the accuracy of any data it 
provides that may be used in determining MUA/P or HPSA designa-
tions; providing inaccurate data could arguably constitute a false claim 
under the FCA.94 
C. Programs, Laws, and Policies Intended to Support the Financial 
Viability of Rural Providers 
In light of the significant workforce and financial challenges many 
rural providers face, Congress and HHS have created a variety of 
programs and legal or regulatory exceptions to support rural providers. 
An overview of these programs and exceptions serves to highlight the 
 
93. Under the PPACA, HHS is directed to publish an interim final rule and 
then, following a public notice-and-comment period, a final rule. Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 5602(g), 124 
Stat. 119, 679 (2010). Because the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee 
failed to reach a technical “consensus,” it is unclear how HHS will proceed 
at this point. The PPACA provides that if the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Committee is “unlikely to reach . . . consensus . . . the Secretary [of HHS] 
may terminate such process and provide for the publication of a rule 
through such other methods as the Secretary may provide.” § 5602(e). As 
of yet, HHS has apparently not attempted a subsequent rulemaking. See 
Negotiated Rulemaking Committee on Designation of MUPs and HPSAs, 
HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/advisorycommittees/shortage/ (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2013) (reporting actions since November 2011). 
94. In such a situation, however, a provider could potentially assert that 
designation as an MUA/P or HPSA is not a “condition of payment” where 
there is potential FCA liability for making false certifications. See United 
States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc., 543 F.3d 
1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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support offered to rural providers and draw attention to how such 
programs may give rise to additional FCA concerns. 
1. Rural Health Clinics 
In 1977, Congress created a program allowing certain rural providers 
to be federally designated as Rural Health Clinics (RHCs).95 In creating 
this program, Congress sought to address threats to financial stability 
that many rural providers experience, including: difficulty replacing 
retiring providers, a disproportionately elderly population, relatively high 
operation costs, and a lack of revenue from private, third-party payers.96 
A provider who qualifies for designation as a RHC is able to take  
advantage of Medicare’s potentially more lucrative cost-based reimburse-
ment methodology.  
RHCs obtain their status based on a series of location, personnel, 
and service criteria. To qualify as a RHC, a health facility must be 
located in a non-urbanized area in which there is an inadequate supply 
of health care providers.97 RHCs are required to provide ordinary 
primary care service98 and have first response capabilities.99 If a RHC is 
not able to provide radiology services or hospital care, the clinic must 
arrange for patients to receive these services at another facility.100 
Finally, RHCs are required to employ at least one mid-level provider 
(such as a physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or nurse midwife) who 
must staff the RHC at least 50 percent of the time the clinic is open.101 
If a provider obtains certification from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) that it is a RHC, it can bill Medicare through 
cost-based reimbursement.102 Cost-based reimbursement is calculated by 
 
95. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, ISSUE PAPER: RURAL HEALTH CLINICS 1 
(2007), available at http://www.ruralhealthweb.org/index.cfm? objectid= 
3F504056-1185-6B66-8862A255663EE0E5; see Pub. L. No. 95-210, § 1(c), 
91 Stat. 1485, 1485 (amending Section 1861, part B of title XVIII of the 
Social Security Act to provide payment for rural health clinic services). 
96. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 95. 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(aa)(2)(K)–(K)(i) (2006). 
98. Id. § 1395x(aa)(1). 
99. Id. § 1395x(aa)(2)(B). 
100. Id. § 1395x(aa)(2)(D). 
101. Id. § 1395x(aa)(2)(J). A RHC may obtain a one-year waiver to this 
requirement if it can demonstrate that it “has been unable, despite 
reasonable efforts, to hire a physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or 
certified nurse-midwife in the previous 90-day period.” Id.  
§ 1395x(aa)(7)(A). 
102. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.2462 (2011); OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH POLICY, 
HRSA, STARTING A RURAL HEALTH CLINIC—A HOW-TO MANUAL 6-1 to 6-2 
(2004), http://www.narhc.org/uploads/pdf/RHCmanual1.pdf (explaining 
RHC cost reporting and reimbursement). 
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dividing allowable costs (expenses that have an associated maximum 
value) by the number of visits made to a RHC.103 HHS has observed that 
all-inclusive averages usually amount to more than fee-for-service 
payments and that most RHCs see a 25–75 percent increase in revenue 
once they become eligible for cost-based reimbursement.104 As such, the 
RHC designation is potentially valuable for a clinic in a rural area that 
relies heavily on Medicare patients. 
One area of concern identified by HHS OIG relates to methodologies 
used by CMS to identify rural or underserved areas and populations.105 
In a 2005 review of the RHC program, OIG concluded that the method-
ologies and review processes currently in place allowed for potentially 
several hundred RHCs to operate in areas that were not truly under-
served rural areas.106 OIG consequently recommended “requiring current 
and prospective RHCs to provide additional evidence of community 
need.”107 OIG further recommended that CMS be able to “terminate 
those clinics that do not meet the basic location requirements unless 
they demonstrate that the clinics are essential community providers for 
their service areas.”108 OIG’s recommendations focus on the need for 
CMS to update its designation criteria and do not suggest concern that 
RHCs are currently misrepresenting their status. However, to the extent 
that CMS adopts practices requiring many RHCs to show that they “are 
essential community providers,” misleading or inaccurate representations 
by the provider to assure continued designation as a RHC could poten-
tially be considered a “false claim” under the FCA. Rural providers must 
therefore assure that any such representations are not potentially false or 
misleading. 
2. Federally Qualified Health Centers and Their Look-Alikes  
The Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC) program was enacted 
and expanded under the 1989 and 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
 
103. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE CLAIMS 
PROCESSING MANUAL § 20.4 (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/ Downloads/clm104c09.pdf. 
104. OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH POLICY, supra note 102.  
105. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., STATUS OF THE RURAL HEALTH CLINIC PROGRAM (2005), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-03-00170.pdf.  
106. Id. at 8–9. The report found that 279 RHCs were in areas that were 
neither designated as a health shortage area or a non-urban area. Another 
946 RHCs in health shortage areas had not been reviewed within the past 
three years to determine whether the area should still carry this health 
shortage designation. Id. at 8. 
107. Id. at 16. 
108. Id. at 17. 
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Acts, respectively.109 Although a FQHC may be in an urban or rural 
region, the facility must serve a MUA/P.110 The FQHC designation is 
only available to public agencies and non-profit corporations that run 
under a board of directors.111 A FQHC is required to supply primary care 
and make available the following services either onsite or through 
arrangements with another facility: emergency care, pharmacy, lab 
testing, radiology services, preventative health and dental, transporta-
tion, hospital care, and case management.112 Although the qualification 
standards are much more complex, the federal assistance available to 
rural providers designated as FQHCs is much greater than what is 
available to RHCs.  
By statutory definition, a FQHC is generally an entity that receives 
a grant from (or operates under a facility that receives a grant from) the 
federal government under Section 330 of the Public Health Services Act 
(PHSA).113 A facility that meets the requirements for receiving such a 
grant but does not acquire one is known as an FQHC Look-Alike.114 
Apart from the potential for federal grant funding, other benefits for 
FQHCs and Look-Alikes include access to discounted prescription drugs 
under the Drug Discount pricing program authorized by Section 340 of 
the PHSA, eligibility to bring in new personnel associated with the 
National Health Service Corps loan repayment program,115 and the 
 
109. HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., COMPARISON OF THE RURAL HEALTH CLINIC AND FEDERALLY 
QUALIFIED HEALTH CENTER PROGRAMS 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.ask.hrsa.gov/downloads/fqhc-rhccomparison.pdf. 
110. Id. at 11.  
111. Id. at 12.  
112. Id. at 13.  
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(aa)(4)(A)(i) (2006) (defining FQHC as “an entity which 
is receiving a grant under section 330 of the Public Health Service Act”). 
There are several other types of entities that also meet the definition of 
FQHC. Id. § 1395x(aa)(4)(A)(ii)–(D).  
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(aa)(4)(B) (2006). The term “look-alike” is not in the 
statutory definition of FQHCs. However, this term is commonly used in 
Medicare guidance to describe the types of entities defined in  
§ 1395(aa)(4)(B). See, e.g., CMS MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, 
FEDERALLY QUALIFIED HEALTH CENTER, RURAL HEALTH FACT SHEET 
SERIES 1 (2012), http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/fqhcfactsheet.pdf. 
115. NAT’L ASS’N OF CMTY. HEALTH CTRS., SO YOU WANT TO START A HEALTH 
CENTER . . . ?: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR STARTING A FEDERALLY QUALIFIED 
HEALTH CENTER 2 (2011), https://www.nachc.com/client/documents/ 
So%20you%20want%20to%20Start-Final%20July%202011.pdf.  
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ability to hire a Medicaid eligibility worker with the authority to grant 
Medicaid coverage to those who qualify.116  
Additionally, any medical malpractice claims against providers work-
ing for FQHCs that receive grant funding cannot be brought in state 
court.117 Rather, such claims must be filed in federal court under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act118 and federal government attorneys will defend 
the FQHC at no cost to the FQHC.119 Thus, many health professionals 
who work at FQHCs may avoid the expense of carrying malpractice 
insurance.120  
FQHCs that receive grant funding under the PHSA should be  
particularly aware of the potential for FCA claims on the basis of “false 
certification.”121 In cases involving a false certification theory, liability “is 
predicated upon a false representation of compliance with a federal 
statute or regulation or prescribed contractual term.”122 Considering the 
potential breadth of these types of claims,123 courts have indicated that a 
 
116. TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS, OUTSTATIONED 
ELIGIBILITY WORKERS AT FQHCS: A LOOK AT COST EFFECTIVENESS 2 
(2006), http://www.tachc.org/content/Outstationed_Eligibility_Workers_ 
at_FQHCs.pdf.  
117. 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), (c) (2011). In order to receive this benefit, the FQHC 
must obtain a designation as a “Public Health Service employee” and meet 
certain criteria, including implementing appropriate risk-reduction 
procedures and verifying the professional credentials of its practitioners. Id. 
§ 233(h).  
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). 
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(b). 
120. FTCA FAQs, HRSA, http://bphc.hrsa.gov/ftca/about/aboutfaqs.html 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (noting that “the Health Center FTCA Program 
saves health center grantees millions of dollars yearly”). 
121. As one commentator has explained, “FCA liability in false certification 
cases turns on a finding that the defendant expressly or impliedly certified 
compliance with all Medicare and Medicaid rules, regulations and 
requirements, but that certification turned out to be false.” Dayna Bowen 
Matthew, An Economic Model to Analyze the Impact of False Claims Act 
Cases on Access to Healthcare for the Elderly, Disabled, Rural and Inner-
City Poor, 27 AM. J. LEG. MED. 439, 443 (2001); see United States ex rel. 
Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is the false 
certification of compliance which creates liability.”). 
122. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001). The Mikes court 
clarified that this type of claim is also referred to as “‘legally false’ 
certification.” Id. at 697 (citing Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, 
Application of the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance 
Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 111–12 (1999), 
and distinguishing it from claims “which involve[] an incorrect description 
of goods or services provided or a request for reimbursement for goods or 
services never provided.”).  
123. See Monica P. Navarro, Materiality: A Needed Return to Basics in False 
Claims Act Liability 8 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (“[T]he need to 
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provider’s false certification to the government that it is in compliance 
with the law only constitutes an FCA violation if such legal compliance 
is an express “condition to governmental payment.”124 For example, in 
United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc.,125 a 
whistleblower alleged that a health center violated the FCA by falsely 
certifying in its annual cost report that it was in compliance with 
Medicaid statutes and regulations.126 In Conner, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and held that such 
alleged “false certification” could not form the basis for an FCA claim 
because the certification “does not contain language stating that payment 
is conditioned on perfect compliance with any particular law or regulation. 
Nor does any underlying Medicare statute or regulation provide that 
payment is so conditioned.”127  
It is unclear, however, to what extent the requirement that the false 
certification concern a condition of payment would present a viable 
defense to a rural provider, such as an FQHC, that allegedly made false 
statements in obtaining funding under the PHSA.128 In United States ex 
rel. Parato v. UnaHealth, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Georgia denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the 
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that funding for a FQHC under Section 
330 of the PHSA was conditioned upon truthful certifications in the 
 
continue to define and circumscribe the purview of the express certification 
theory became apparent to the courts, which then began to impose 
additional requirements for liability under the theory.”). 
124. See, e.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d at 697 (“We join the Fourth, Fifth, 
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits in ruling that a claim under the 
Act is legally false only where a party certifies compliance with a statute or 
regulation as a condition to governmental payment.”); see also United 
States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 
1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[F]alse certification of compliance with a statute or 
regulation cannot serve as the basis for a qui tam action under the FCA 
unless payment is conditioned on that certification.”); United States ex rel. 
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (“We agree with the district court that claims for services 
rendered in violation of a statute do not necessarily constitute false or 
fraudulent claims under the FCA.”). 
125. 543 F.3d 1211, 1211 (10th Cir. 2008). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1219; see also Navarro, supra note 123, at 6 (noting that Conner “is 
a clear example of the excessive reliance that litigants placed on the 
express certification theory.”). 
128. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, the analysis applied in Conner is 
problematic because the rule regarding what constitutes “a ‘condition to 
payment’ for FCA liability, as required by the theory, was left undefined.” 
Navarro, supra note 123, at 8. 
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grant application.129 The Parato court distinguished Conner by noting 
that, unlike the defendant in Conner, “UnaHealth was a grant applicant 
for government funds, not a contractor participating in a program to 
perform services and then bill the Government for payment . . . .”130 The 
Parato court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
because it found that the particular certification on the FQHC applica-
tion at issue only applied prospectively and the plaintiff’s evidence 
related to alleged past noncompliance.131 The significance of Parato is 
that false or misleading representations or certifications made on a grant 
application may give rise to FCA liability, even where the provider may 
have viable defenses in relation to similar representations made on an 
application to participate as a Medicare provider. Because FQHCs rely 
on this type of grant funding, such providers should be particularly 
aware of this area of potential liability.  
3. Critical Access Hospitals 
In addition to RHCs and FQHCs, the federal government has also 
shown initiative in supporting rural hospitals. The Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997 allowed for the establishment of Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) 
in participating states.132 All states except Connecticut, Delaware,  
Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have accepted federal funding to 
create programs that allow for CAHs to be developed as long as certain 
eligibility requirements are met.133 
Although states are in charge of creating their own CAH programs,134 
a hospital must meet certain requirements to qualify. Specifically, a CAH 
facility must be not-for-profit and located in a rural area—defined as 
thirty-five miles from any other hospital (or fifteen miles if the area has 
more limited accessibility).135 Each facility is also responsible for having 
twenty-four-hour emergency services available to serve the area and can 
have a maximum of fifteen beds reserved for in-patient use that exceeds 
no more than ninety-six hours, or twenty-five beds designated for either 
short- or long-term care.136  
129. United States v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1796, at *40–41 (M.D. Ga., Jan. 11, 2010). 
130. Id. at *19. 
131. See United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr., 787 F. Supp. 
2d 1329, 1340 (M.D. Ga. 2011). 
132. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4201, 111 Stat. 251, 
373–74 (1997). 
133. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS FACT SHEET 2 (2012), 
http://www.cms.gov/MLNProducts/downloads/CritAccessHospfctsht.pdf. 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(a)–(b) (2006). 
135. Id. § 1395i-4(c)(2)(B)(i). 
136. Id. § 1395i-4(c)(2)(B)(ii).  
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CAHs receive 101 percent of the costs of approved Medicare services,137 
including inpatient care, outpatient visits, laboratory tests, and post-
acute care in a skilled nursing facility.138 In addition to receiving special-
ized Medicare reimbursement, rural providers who work in CAHs also 
receive financial incentives. A physician who works at a CAH in a HPSA 
may qualify for bonus pay as an additional percentage of the cost of 
treating a Medicare patient. Eligibility continues to increase for CAHs 
and more rural hospitals are able to receive the federal support that this 
particular program offers. The requirement that the facility be located a 
certain distance from a nearby hospital is easily waived, and as of 
October 2011, only 65 percent of CAHs actually met the obligation 
without a waiver.139 
4.  National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Programs 
In addition to programs that support rural facilities, the federal gov-
ernment has also created incentives intended to expand the number of 
rural health care providers in practice through loan repayment programs. 
The National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Program offers up 
to $60,000 in student loan repayment per health care provider willing to 
spend a set amount of time working in a rural region.140 Providers that 
work full time for up to two years or part-time for up to four years in the 
highest-ranked shortage areas qualify for the most repayment.141 Eligibility 
extends to physicians, nurses, physician assistants, dentists, dental 
hygienists, and mental health providers in a variety of specialties.142 
Repayment programs for providers in HPSAs are set to increase under 
the PPACA.143 Beginning in 2010, the federal government allocated $195 
million for the Public Health Workforce Loan Repayment program and 
by 2015, the National Health Services Corps will receive a funding 
increase of over $1.1 billion to help repay provider loans.144  
 
137. Payment Basics: Critical Access Hospitals Payment System, MEDPAC 1, 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_11_ 
CAH.pdf (last updated Oct. 2011). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. BUREAU OF CLINICIAN RECRUITMENT & SERV., U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS LOAN REPAYMENT 
PROGRAM 1 (2013), http://nhsc.hrsa.gov/downloads/lrpataglance.pdf.  
141. Id. at 2.  
142. Id. at 2. 
143. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 5604 
and 5207 124 Stat. 678 (2010). 
144. KEITH J. MUELLER, RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: A SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS 
IMPORTANT TO RURAL HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 5 (2010), available at 
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5. Stark and Anti-Kickback Provisions Impacting Rural Providers 
In addition to the various programs discussed above, other health 
care fraud and abuse laws and regulations contain exceptions that apply 
only to rural providers. By carving out these exceptions, Congress and 
regulatory agencies have sought to account for the circumstances under 
which rural providers operate. 
a. The Stark Law 
The so-called “Stark Law”145 prohibits physicians from referring 
Medicare and Medicaid patients for “designated health services” to 
entities with which the physician or an immediate family member of the 
physician has an ownership, investment, or compensation interest.146 The 
purpose of the law is to prevent overutilization caused by a physician’s 
financial interest in referring patients for unnecessary services.147 The 
Stark Law was enacted in 1989 after a study of Medicare claims from 
1987 showed that Medicare patients of physicians with a financial 
interest in an independent clinical laboratory “received, on the average, 
45 percent more clinical laboratory services than all Medicare patients in 
general, regardless of place.”148 The law originally applied only to 
referrals by physicians to clinical laboratory services but has expanded 




145. The law, as originally enacted, is called the “Ethics in Patient Referrals 
Act,” Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2137, 2236, but it is 
commonly called the “Stark Law” after its sponsor, Democratic 
representative Pete Stark from California. The section of the United States 
Code containing the law is labeled “Limitation on certain physician 
referrals,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn, and it is also commonly referred to as the 
“physician self-referral law.” See Physician Self-Referral, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-
Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/index.html (last updated Mar. 27, 2012). 
146. Id. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A). 
147. See Susan O. Scheutzow & Steven A. Eisenberg, The Employee Exceptions 
to the Anti-Kickback and Stark Laws After Tuomey: What’s a Physician’s 
Employer to Do?, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 146, 160 n.21 (2011) (“The 
Stark Law’s main purposes are to prevent overutilization by prohibiting a 
physician from making a referral for certain services to an entity with 
whom the physician has a compensation arrangement or ownership interest 
except in certain situations, and to ensure that physicians’ medical 
judgments are not compromised by improper financial incentives and are 
based solely on the best interests of the patient.”).  
148. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, OAI-12-88-01410, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN 
PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: REPORT TO CONGRESS 18 
(1989), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-12-88-01410.pdf. 
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services (DHSs).149 The impact of this law is that a physician cannot 
invest in an entity offering DHSs and then refer Medicare and Medicaid 
patients for such services unless the arrangement falls within one of the 
exceptions to the Stark law.150 Although the statute has been amended 
to expand the scope of the law,151 the statute and accompanying regula-
tions also provide a number of exceptions for common financial 
arrangements in the health arena.152  
Although there is no provision exempting rural physicians and DHS 
providers from the entire Stark Law, there are various exceptions that 
substantially limit the scope of the law in rural areas. Under one of the 
most sweeping exceptions, physicians are permitted to make referrals to 
DHS entities in which they have ownership interests if the DHS provider 
is located in a rural area153 and “substantially all (not less than 75 
percent)” of such services are provided to individuals living in the rural 
area.154 In other words, the Stark self-referral prohibition does not apply 
to a physician making an ownership investment interest in a DHS 
provider such as a clinical laboratory and then referring Medicaid and 
Medicare patients to it. This rural area exception, however, does not 
 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6).  
150. Although Stark does not prohibit a physician from having an ownership 
interest in a DHS provider, “the law makes it impractical to do so in many 
situations, by prohibiting certain referrals as well as reimbursement . . . .” 
DEAN M. HARRIS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS 
149–50 (3d ed. 2008).  
151. David E. Matyas, Fundamentals of Health Law Fraud and Abuse, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 149, 174 (Barry Alexander et al. eds., 5th 
ed. 2012) (noting that the law “originally only applied to the provision of 
clinical laboratory services”).  
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)–(d) (2006) (providing statutory exceptions to 
Stark’s self-referral prohibition). The statute’s definition of the term 
“referral” puts certain other activities outside the scope the Stark Law. Id. 
§ 1395nn(h)(5)(C). Additionally, the statute’s definition of the term 
“referral” puts certain other activities outside the scope the Stark Law. See 
id. § 1395nn(h)(5)(C). Finally, provisions in HHS regulations interpreting 
the Stark Law also carve out various other limited exceptions. See, e.g., 42 
C.F.R. § 411.357(t) (2011) (describing a regulatory exception permitting, 
under certain circumstances, a hospital to make “[r]etention payments” to 
a physician practicing in an underserved area). A full discussion of the 
complex array of exceptions to the Stark law is beyond on the scope of this 
Article. For a helpful introduction to the topic, see Matyas, supra note 
151, at 180–94. 
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(2). For the purposes of Stark, a rural area is 
considered any non-urban area. Id. § 412.62(f)(iii) (2011). In other words, 
Stark essentially applies the definition of “rural” used by the Office of 
Management and Budget. See What is Rural? Frequently Asked Questions, 
RURAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, http://www.raconline.org/topics/ruraldef/ 
ruraldeffaq.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).  
154. 42 C.F.R. § 411.356(c)(1) (2011). 
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apply to “compensation” arrangements between a physician and DHS 
provider. CMS also carved out a regulatory exception for payments made 
directly to physicians by a hospital that provides DHSs to encourage the 
physicians to keep their practice in a HPSA.155  
b. The Anti-Kickback Statute 
The Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) prohibits “knowingly and willfully” 
soliciting, receiving, offering, or paying “any remuneration” in return for 
referring or directing patients whose care will be paid for “in whole or in 
part under a Federal health care program.”156 Unlike the Stark Law, 
which imposes strict liability, the AKS is a criminal statute that requires 
knowing and willful conduct. However, HHS regulations have created 
various voluntary safe harbors that “protect certain payment and 
business practices that could otherwise implicate the AKS from criminal 
and civil prosecution.”157 A number of these safe harbors apply specifically 
to providers in rural and other underserved areas, thus facilitating a 
broader range of financial arrangements for rural providers. 
More recently, HHS created a safe harbor that applies to FQHCs, 
many of which are located in and serve rural areas.158 Specifically, this 
safe harbor excludes from the AKS’s definition of “remuneration” many 
“goods, items, services, donations or loans” provided to an FQHC to 
support the FQHC’s operations so long as certain criteria are met.159 
Significantly, the safe harbor requires that there be a signed, written 
agreement, that the amount of the contribution be fixed or set by a fixed 
methodology not conditioned on referrals or business generation, that 
contribution to the FQHC be “medical or clinical in nature,” and that 
the FQHC “reasonably expects the arrangement to contribute meaning-
fully” to the health center’s mission.160 
There are also safe harbors to the AKS related to investments in 
health care companies by individuals who may be in a position to refer 
or prescribe products or services offered by those companies.161 For some 
investments in rural areas, the criteria for the investment to come within 
the safe harbor are relaxed. There is a fairly straightforward safe harbor 
for investments in large, publicly traded corporations.162 This safe 
 
155. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(t) (2011); see also Matyas, supra note 151, at 188. 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2011). 
157. OIG ROADMAP, supra note 29, at 4. 
158. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(w) (2011). 
159. Id. § 1001.952(w)(1)–(9). 
160. Id. § 1001.952(w)(1)–(3). 
161. See id. § 1001.952(a) 
162. Id. § 1001.952(a)(1). In order to fall within this safe harbor, if the entity 
invested in has a net worth of greater than $50 million, the investment is a 
security registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
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harbor, which applies equally to urban and rural providers, allows for 
the common situation of a physician owning a pharmaceutical company’s 
stock as part of an investment portfolio without the physician risking 
running afoul the AKS. For investment interests in smaller health care 
companies, however, HHS created a separate and much more complex 
safe harbor. This “small investment interest” safe harbor requires strict 
adherence to eight criteria.163 Among these criteria are the requirements 
that no more than 40 percent of the investment interest can be held by 
investors in a position to generate referrals or business and that no more 
than 40 percent of gross revenue can come from referrals or business 
generated by investors.164 For providers serving MUAs (including 
medically underserved rural areas), up to 50 percent of the investment 
interest can be held by such investors and there is no limit to the 
percentage of revenue that comes from investor-generated business and 
referrals.165 As such, this provision makes it easier for physicians in rural 
areas to pool their resources to invest the capital necessary to bring 
ancillary services to rural areas. 
HHS has also provided a safe harbor for payments by hospitals and 
other activities to recruit physicians to practice in HPSAs.166 To come 
within this safe harbor, there are nine requirements, including the 
execution of a written agreement and that there be no requirements for 
the recruited physician to refer patients to the recruiting hospital.167 
Another safe harbor exists for obstetrical malpractice insurance subsidies 
for practitioners working in HPSAs.168 
 
investment interest is obtained on the same terms and for the same price 
as the general public. Id. § 1001.952(a)(1)–(a)(1)(ii). 
163. Id. § 1001.952(a)(2). These eight criteria are: (1) no more than 40 percent 
of the investment can be held by individuals in a position to generate 
referrals or business; (2) the terms of the investment must be the same 
regardless of whether or not the investor is in a position to generate 
referrals and business; (3) the terms of the investment cannot be tied to 
the generation of referrals or business; (4) cannot require investors to 
generate referrals; (5) no requirement that an investor market the 
company’s items or products; (6) no more than 40 percent of gross revenue 
can come from referrals or business generated by investors; (7) the entity 
cannot make loans (including loan guarantees) to an investor in a position 
to generate referrals or business; and (8) dividends and other payments 
must be proportional to the capital each investor has contributed. Id.  
§ 1001.952(a)(2)(i)–(viii). 
164. Id. § 1001.952(a)(2)(i), (vi). 
165. Id. § 1001.952(3)(i)(A). 
166. Id. § 1001.952(n). 
167. Id. § 1001.952(n)(1)–(9). 
168. Id. § 1001.952(o). 
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III. Preventing Unilateral Whistleblower Claims 
against Certain Rural Providers 
As illustrated above, rural health care providers routinely face finan-
cial difficulties. To account for the context in which rural providers 
operate, policymakers have established programs and legal or regulatory 
exceptions specific to rural providers. One area where the law applies 
equally to rural providers as other providers, however, is in relation to 
claims brought by whistleblowers under the FCA. DOJ policy expressly 
directs government attorneys to take into account the impact on a 
community’s access to care in determining how or whether to pursue a 
civil FCA case.169 This policy does not apply to whistleblowers, who are 
free to pursue such cases unilaterally where the government chooses not 
to intervene. 
From the preceding discussion, several things are clear. First, pro-
viders in rural, underserved areas operate in a financially unstable 
environment and rely on a variety of federal programs. The expense and 
burden of defending what may be a meritless civil FCA claim may 
present a substantial difficulty for such providers who are relatively 
unsophisticated170 compared to larger organizations in more populous 
areas, have slim operating margins, and cannot afford insurance that 
clearly covers FCA liability and defense costs. Second, unilateral 
whistleblower FCA actions play a very minimal role in recovering 
wrongfully obtained government funds from health care providers. 
Because of this reality, Congress should consider amending the statute to 
permit civil FCA whistleblower claims against rural providers in under-
served areas, such as HPSAs and MUA/Ps, to proceed only if the 
government intervenes.171 
 
169. Holder, supra note 43. 
170. One empirical study found that managers at larger health care 
organizations generally found governmental billing compliance guidance 
material more understandable. Daniel P. Lorence & Ibrahim Awad 
Ibrahim, Identifying Barriers to Billing Compliance, 30 J. HEALTH CARE 
FIN. 49, 60 (2003); see also COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH 
CARE, QUALITY THROUGH COLLABORATION: THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH 
100 (2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11140 
(“Traditionally, many rural health administrators have backgrounds in 
clinical or technical fields and have learned management skills on the 
job.”).  
171. This Article focuses primarily on why Congress should amend the FCA in 
this regard. However, twenty-eight states currently have state false claims 
act under which a whistleblower could bring claims in relation to Medicaid 
and other health programs involving state funding. See, e.g, State False 
Claims Act Reviews, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/ 
state-false-claims-act-reviews/index.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). States 
that enact FCAs that are substantially similar to the federal civil FCA—
including the whistleblower provisions—receive a larger share of 
misappropriated Medicaid funds recovered under such statutes. See 42 
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This change would have little or no impact on cases where there is 
evidence that a provider engaged in egregious conduct,172 as a private 
whistleblower with insider information would still have the same oppor-
tunity and financial incentives to bring the claim. The only difference is 
that such a claim would only be able to move forward if the government’s 
attorneys choose to intervene after reviewing the sealed complaint and 
conducting an initial investigation.173 In other cases, however, government 
attorneys may discover through this early investigation that a whistle-
blower’s claims are based on a misinterpretation of billing regulations174 or 
are simply a disgruntled former employee’s attempt to retaliate against 
the defendant.175 In such cases, government attorneys would be able to  
U.S.C. § 1396h (2006). This Article’s argument for limiting the scope of 
whistleblower provisions against rural providers applies equally to both the 
federal FCA and analogous state FCAs.  
172. One commentator presents a similar argument in relation to academic 
teaching hospitals: “No one could dispute that hardship or not, fraudulent 
institutions should be aggressively investigated and relentlessly prosecuted. 
However, the internal and social costs of such investigations are high, and 
care should be taken so that the mystique of the health care fraud law 
enforcement machine does not seduce the regulator into becoming a hunter 
when there is no prey.” Bucy, supra note 42, at 50. 
173. Several commentators have proposed a similar statutory reform to all cases 
brought under the FCA, not just those involving providers in designated 
underserved rural areas. See generally J. Randy Beck, The False Claims 
Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 
539, 637–41 (2000); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem 
with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical 
Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 332–37 (2007).  
174. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
in a qui tam FCA outside the health care context, perhaps best summed up 
the concern that a qui tam litigant may erroneously interpret “confusion” 
about ambiguous regulations as conduct violating the FCA, stating: 
  
Forty years ago Jimi Hendrix trilled his plaintive query: “Is this love, 
baby, or is it . . . [just] confusion?” In this False Claims Act case, we face a 
similar question involving a mortgage subsidy program initiated in that 
era: Is this fraud, or is it . . . just confusion? 
 
 U.S. ex rel. K & R Ltd. P’ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 530 F.3d 980, 
981 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Renal Care Group, 
696 F.3d 518, 531 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a Medicare provider did 
not act in “reckless disregard” when it “followed industry practice in trying 
to sort through ambiguous regulations”).  
175. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney 
General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 
1275 (“While qui tam relators are sometimes championed as moralistic 
heroes courageously fighting corporate malefactors, FCA opponents paint a 
far less flattering portrait. Qui tam’s opponents cast relators as vengeful 
former employees who use the FCA as leverage in garden-variety 
employment disputes.”). 
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prevent the whistleblower from pursuing the claim on their own and 
thereby shield the provider from incurring potentially excessive defense 
costs. This change would also promote the DOJ’s policy of considering 
an underserved rural “community’s interest in access to adequate health 
care along with any other relevant concerns” in pursing FCA cases.176  
Such an amendment would make the determination of whether or 
not to intervene much more significant in cases involving rural providers. 
However, it would also provide government attorneys greater ability to 
assure continued access to care in underserved areas. In light of the 
various programs and regulatory exemptions that apply only to rural 
providers in underserved areas, such a change would not be unprece-
dented. Indeed, the various Stark and AKS exceptions and safe harbors 
that apply only to rural providers illustrate how, even in the context of 
health care fraud and abuse prevention, policymakers recognize the 
context within which rural providers operate. Such a change in the FCA 
is analogous to the policy objective of shielding providers at FQHCs 
from malpractice liability in state court. As explained above, the HRSA 
has stated that shielding FQHCs from such malpractice liability relieves 
those facilities from the obligation to purchase malpractice insurance, 
thereby freeing up federal grant funds to serve more patients. Similarly, 
to the extent that a rural provider’s FCA liability exposure can be 
limited to only cases the government deems worth pursuing, additional 
federal grant funds and enhanced Medicare payments can be dedicated 
to serving patients rather than defending FCA claims.  
Such a policy change would add a measure of stability to the financial 
insecurity rural providers often confront. Considering how heavily rural 
providers rely government programs for funding, such a change may be 
particularly beneficial.177 It may increase the relative attractiveness of 
rural practice.178 Drawing upon empirical studies investigating how 
reimbursement rates impact access to care, one commentator concluded 
that “increased costs associated with unpredictable exposure to damages 
and litigation costs . . . may have a negative impact on access to 
healthcare.”179  
As noted above, publicly available DOJ statistics do not specify how 
many FCA claims brought in the health arena are against rural provid-
 
176. Holder, supra note 43. 
177. See Matthew, supra note 121, at 462 (“[P]roviders serving the urban and 
rural poor are especially at risk of becoming the target of the government’s 
fight against fraud due to the large numbers of Medicare and Medicaid 
patients who they serve.”). 
178. The “little financial reward” associated with practicing in rural areas is 
among the causes cited for physician shortages in rural areas. Id. at 461. 
179. Id. at 464–65. 
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ers,180 and it is unclear how often rural providers are named in such 
lawsuits.181 But it is clear from existing data that unilateral whistleblow-
er FCA claims account for a very small proportion of total FCA 
recoveries. Considering this situation, requiring the government to 
intervene in order for a qui tam action against a rural provider to 
proceed would likely have little or no appreciable impact on DOJ and 
OIG enforcement efforts. Conversely, such a policy change would by no 
means be a silver bullet in addressing access to care shortfalls in rural 
areas of the United States. Yet it would add a small measure of additional 
security to struggling rural health care providers and prevent the 
possibility that one would face a substantial financial hardship. 
 
 
180. Public access to additional and more specific empirical data would 
facilitate an informed analysis as to whether the argument presented here 
would detrimentally impact FCA recoveries. As one commentator put it, 
“One reason litigation politics have become so dysfunctional in recent 
decades is a lack of empirical data that can inform public debate.” 
Engstrom, supra note 175, at 1318–19. Although Professor Engstrom 
provides an in-depth empirical analysis of qui tam based on a variety of 
factors, this analysis focuses primarily on the characteristics of the qui tam 
relator and the relator’s attorney; it does not detail characteristics of the 
defendant such as health care provider type or size. Id. at 1286–1305.  
181. Considering the slim financial resources rural providers often have, 
however, even a small number of such cases could have a detrimental 
impact on access to care in underserved rural areas. 
